paper

I’m reading some papers about mechanism design on pricing of information, following up on this data trading reading session Bergemann et al. (AER 2018): The Design and Price of Information. Bergemann et al. (EC 2022): Is Selling Completely Information (Approximately) Optimal? Bergemann et al. (EC 2015): Selling Cookies. Hopefully, I’ll finish them within this week. I have a strong feeling that they will be immensely interesting. Before our discussion, a short notice: a review of numerous news posts and literature in econ-CS reveals a significant discrepancy between academic research on data trading in algorithmic game theory (AGT) and Econ-CS communities, and the evolving realities of the actual data trading market....

bridging concepts Recently, I’ve come to realize that there is a nuanced distinction between mechanism design and market design. Initially, I conflated the two, but a deeper dive into the subject matter—prompted by a friend’s bachelor thesis—has elucidated the critical differences. Mechanism design is inherently algorithmic, centered around eliciting information and strategically manipulating incentives through mathematical formulations. It’s a toolset for creating environments where desired outcomes can be achieved based on the information asymmetries and strategic interactions of participants....

It’s always a refreshing activity to start the morning with a MS paper - even better, a freshly published one right in Nov. 2023. Dynamic Persuasion and Strategic Search Yunfei (Jesse) Yao, Management Science 22 Nov 2023 ABSTRACT Consumers frequently search for information before making decisions. Because their search and purchase decisions depend on the information environment, firms have a strong incentive to influence it. This paper endogenizes the consumer’s information environment from the firm’s perspective and endogenizes the search decision from the consumer’s perspective....

Finished reading the paper Suspense And Surprise finally. Honestly, the paper itself is already a masterclass of organizing contents so as to achieve high informational utility. Following what we left yesterday, here’s the rest, and some closing thoughts before the end. Illustrations of Suspense-Opt. Info Policies In the simplest setting where there are only two states $\Omega = {A, B}$ (i.e. whether AGT or FRA would win in the world cup final), suspense maximizing belief martingale give rise to the followig dynamics....

the model, and the principal’s problem part I

a little about music, and application of suspense (aka procrastination)

The very first day of 2024 begins with a lovely paper that I stumbled upon, like, two days ago?

I read an eye-openly impressive paper today - Attention Management by Lipnowski, Mathevet and Wei. TBH, their model is very insightful (well, it’s in AER afterall…) and has potential to shed light on theoretical as well as behavioral econ research.

ArguGPT is an algorithmic tool that is designed to differentiate GPT-generated argumentative essays. But it seems that at least for now, it’s accuracy is doubtful.

The talk was on fireeeee. I actually like this work despite being a little bit biased towards the general fair division literature.