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speaker: Ming Hu | Prof., University of Toronto Keys: random product offering/demand allocation/pricing algorithm. TALK ABSTRACT: First, we study blind boxes as a novel selling mechanism in which buyers purchase sealed packages containing unknown items, with the chance of uncovering rare or special items. We show how such product randomization introduced by the blind box can improve the seller’s profitability over traditional separate selling. Second, we study how an e-commerce platform should assign sequentially arriving customers to sellers who compete to sell identical products on the platform....

speaker: Peng Sun | Prof., Duke University TALK ABSTRACT: New prescription drugs require regulatory approval before drug makers can sell them. In some countries, regulators may conditionally approve a drug, which allows sales to begin before the developer has proven the drug’s efficacy. After further testing, the regulator may either grant final approval or reject the drug. We show that conditional approval not only speeds access to drugs but also encourages the development of drugs that would not have been pursued otherwise....

speaker: Ningyuan Chen | Prof., University of Toronto related paper: Allocating Divisible Resources on Arms with Unknown and Random Rewards TALK ABSTRACT: We consider a decision maker allocating one unit of renewable and divisible resource in each period on a number of arms. The arms have unknown and random rewards whose means are proportional to the allocated resource and whose variances are proportional to an order b of the allocated resource....

speaker: Guillermo Gallego | Prof., The Chinese University of Hong Kong-Shenzhen. TALK ABSTRACT: To study the limits of personalization, we introduce the notion of a clairvoyant firm that can read the mind of consumers and sell them the highest revenue product that they are willing to buy. We show how to compute the expected revenue of the clairvoyant firm for a class of rational discrete choice models, and develop prophet-type inequalities that provide performance guarantees for the expected revenue of the traditional assortment optimization firm (a TAOP firm) relative to the clairvoyant firm, and therefore to any effort to personalize assortments....

This week, Chenhao Zhang from Northwestern University visited ITCS and gave a talk on Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion, based on his ongoing collaboration with Prof. Jason Hartline. Here’s a background of the topic, summary of the talk and their work (hopefully), and some discussion afterwards. Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion ABSTRACT Consider sellers in a competitive market that use algorithms to adapt their prices from data that they collect. In such a context it is plausible that algorithms could arrive at prices that are higher than the competitive prices and this may benefit sellers at the expense of consumers (i....

My advisor was somehow less enthusiastic in information design as compared to other general algorithm game theory topics–despite my several failed attempts to lure him into doing some related projects. But his major concern is solid, that information design demands overly strong assumptions–the existence of a common prior, commitment of the signal sender, inference ability of the signal receiver–all poses challenges for direct applications that justify the existing theory. The real world should be something in between the perfectly rational Bayesian persuasion and the noisy cheap talks....

Following yesterday, the second paper I’d recommend is Carvalho et al. Penalties and Rewards for Fair Learning in Paired Kidney Exchange Programs (WINE2023). The paper took a data-driven approach and tested its method on Canadian Kidney Exchange program’s data. It established a dynamic (over time) kidney exchange model so as to take in consideration of some aspects missed by myopic naive matching schemes. They developed a novel learning approach to update the weights of the vertices so as to improve equity as well as efficiency....

Looking at two-sided market literatures so as to motivate one of my recently launched project, here’s a brief reading write-up of two papers. Starting with the first one: Ashlagi et al. On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets (OR2019). kidney exchange 101 Before diving into the paper, here’s how kidney exchange actually works. the concept of “exchange” Kidney transplantation is essential for patients with late-stage renal failure. While a healthy individual can donate one of their kidneys to their loved ones, often the donor is incompatible with the intended recipient....

Music exists at the sublime confluence of mathematics and artistry, embodying a synergy that elevates both disciplines. The essence of music theory, particularly in the analysis of chords, mirrors an advanced form of modular arithmetic, showcasing a mathematical elegance. Musical scores serve as encoded scripts of melodies, awaiting decryption and performance. Particularly, Johann Sebastian Bach epitomizes this blend of mathematical intricacy and artistic beauty, standing as a paragon of the fusion between the two realms....

A paper I read recently is somewhat interesting. The model is very inspiring for an OM project I’m working on recently, whereas its mathematical method and results are immensely useful to learn from for another problem that I’ve been working on for a while. Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, and Mingfei Zhao. 2022. ABSTRACT We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty....