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Here’s a summary of the paper Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning, by Kimon Drakopoulos, Shobhit Jai and Ramandeep Randhawa, published online @ Management Science, in 2021. The paper studies the persuasion and pricing problem for a seller with informational advantage about its inventory level. Model: a seller sells a single good over two period to unit-demand buyers, out of inventory $Q$. The inventory level might be low (type L) or high (type H)....

speaker: Zizhuo Wang | Prof., The Chinese University of Hong Kong-Shenzhen. Takeaway: point of view of bridging practice and research. For industry solutions: Need to consider a lot of details Need to be fast and intepretation, therefore requires simple solutions Don’t care about theory. For academic works: Need abstract to focus Graced with time Expect some generality, therefore theory. TALK ABSTRACT: In the past years, there have been growing number of companies in China that adopt OR methods in their operations....

speaker: Ming Hu | Prof., University of Toronto Keys: random product offering/demand allocation/pricing algorithm. TALK ABSTRACT: First, we study blind boxes as a novel selling mechanism in which buyers purchase sealed packages containing unknown items, with the chance of uncovering rare or special items. We show how such product randomization introduced by the blind box can improve the seller’s profitability over traditional separate selling. Second, we study how an e-commerce platform should assign sequentially arriving customers to sellers who compete to sell identical products on the platform....

speaker: Peng Sun | Prof., Duke University TALK ABSTRACT: New prescription drugs require regulatory approval before drug makers can sell them. In some countries, regulators may conditionally approve a drug, which allows sales to begin before the developer has proven the drug’s efficacy. After further testing, the regulator may either grant final approval or reject the drug. We show that conditional approval not only speeds access to drugs but also encourages the development of drugs that would not have been pursued otherwise....

My advisor was somehow less enthusiastic in information design as compared to other general algorithm game theory topics–despite my several failed attempts to lure him into doing some related projects. But his major concern is solid, that information design demands overly strong assumptions–the existence of a common prior, commitment of the signal sender, inference ability of the signal receiver–all poses challenges for direct applications that justify the existing theory. The real world should be something in between the perfectly rational Bayesian persuasion and the noisy cheap talks....