The paper Test-Optimal Admissions by Dessein, Alex Frankel, and Navin Kartik has lingered on my desktop—and the Procrastination Bulletin—for over a year now. It’s time to give it the attention it deserves.
ABSTRACT (from the authors) | Many U.S. colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that “society” dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its “disagreement cost”. We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society. (arXiv here)
How can less information improve decision-making? Commitment (admission mechanisms) and partial information (obfuscation of test scores)—doesn’t this sound information design? Anyway. At first glance, this seemed like a cute math problem inspired by real-world trends. But the complexities of college admissions are far-reaching, as seen in high-profile debates like affirmative action in the U.S. or the intense scrutiny of China’s college entrance exams. These policies don’t just impact individual students—they shape entire societies, influencing how education opportunities are distributed.
Sometimes, researchers need to shed not only their biases but also their original perspectives to fully grasp the broader societal impacts of issues like these.