I am currently reading a paper titled “Incentives for Procrastinators[1]”. It presents a model based on the inter-temporal hyperbolic discounting function, which is used to construct the choice dynamics of a naive procrastinator. The paper then designs a contract aimed at coordinating the actions of this naive procrastinator. This individual mistakenly perceives their future utility, leading to biased decisions that provide room for their employer to arbitrage. This allows the employer to exploit the naive procrastinator’s overoptimism and deceive them, ultimately making an infinite amount of money.
That’s quite a lengthy sentence. To be frank, the model’s mathematical formulation is elegant and clean, but it lacks practical realism. As someone haunted by OCD and plagued by procrastination, I am completely certain that at least some procrastinators do not operate in the manner described. In my case, I procrastinate due to either (i) the opportunity cost of engaging in other events or (ii) a fear of not completing the current task perfectly. Furthermore, the model assumes that the cost of work in each period is stochastic, but once started, the work is completed instantly and deterministically. This, however, does not align with real-world practices.
I believe there is potential for enhancing the theory by incorporating a revealed preference modeling framework. This could be achieved through a more modern, computer science-integrated perspective that employs dynamic programming. Additionally, merging this approach with mechanism design could enrich the range of potential contracts.
I promise not to procrastinate and to provide a comprehensive review and perspective on this paper and its subsequent works in the near future—let’s say, within one week—once I figure out how to type LaTeX on the blog pages. Trust me, it might end up looking like a chicken scratched all over the place, but hey, even genius has its chaotic moments, right?
[1] O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. “Incentives for Procrastinators.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 3 (1999): 769–816. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2586884.