China’s higher education system features a unique postgraduate enrollment mechanism known as “recommendation for postgraduate studies,” or “保研” (Bao-Yan) in Chinese. This system has evolved into a complex game between students and university admissions offices, where commitments are frequently made and then broken, leading to a chaotic landscape of mutual defaults. Students colloquially refer to the act of reneging on commitments as “鸽” (pigeon someone off), reflecting a playful nod to certain aspects of the strategy.

It’s almost a classic view of exploding offers and early unraveling. The system was initially designed to grant universities autonomy. But it seems that decentralized admission offering and centralized enrollment is somewhat hard to co-exist—at least it’s nontrivial design…

The process can be roughly divided into three phases:

Phase 1: Summer Camp (May-August)

During this phase, students apply to and attend summer camp programs at their desired colleges and universities. These camps typically involve on-site exams and interviews, functioning as both an assessment tool for universities and an opportunity for students to familiarize themselves with potential postgraduate environments.

Students often apply to multiple summer camps, and universities give out offers based on performance. However, these offers are not legally binding, and it’s common for both parties to default on them.

Phase 2: Securing the Recommendation Quota (Early September)

After the summer camps conclude and before the official enrollment system opens, students must secure a “recommendation quota” from their undergraduate institutions to participate in this preferential admission process. Each undergraduate institution has a relatively fixed quota annually, and students generally have an idea of their chances based on academic standing.

Occasionally, students who didn’t expect to receive a quota get lucky due to others opting for industry positions or studying abroad. However, these latecomers often struggle to find quality offers since the summer camps have ended and universities are less inclined to extend new offers at this stage.

Phase 3: Official Enrollment System (September)

This is where the chaos intensifies. The enrollment system is designed to operate over approximately a month, but admissions are often finalized within the first few hours of opening.

It works like this: students with a recommendation quota can list up to three preferred universities in the system, without any priority ranking. Submitting a preference acts as a “signal” to the universities, which can then choose to send a time-restricted offer through the system. If a student accepts the offer within the allotted time, they are officially admitted. If not, the student can clear the slot and signal another university.

The time window usually lasts within an hour. Somtimes it’s only within minutes (7 minutes).

Students may strategically delay signaling to certain universities where they are confident of admission, opting instead to wait for offers from more prestigious institutions. Universities, aiming to secure top candidates, may send out more offers at the summer camp than they have slots for, anticipating that some students will decline.

Complications

The current market design makes it a hard time for both parties—creating exploding offers and early market unraveling. The logic is, the insufficient information provided by the system actually nutures Phase 1—the summer camp, when both students and universities have to engage in strategic behavior that undermines the process’s efficiency.

An important factor is the unattractive nature of the outside options for both parties. Students who don’t secure admission through this process must take the centralized postgraduate admission exam—the “KaoYan”—which is almost more competitive than the undergraduate “GaoKao”. Universities that fail to fill their seats now risk ending up with weaker candidates from the later admission rounds. Therefore, it’s reasonable to assume that these outside options offer minimal utility.

What’s Next?

On the positive side, the current system grants universities autonomy in managing admissions, allowing for targeted interviews and assessments rather than relying solely on standardized exams. Students benefit by potentially securing postgraduate placements early, freeing them to focus on internships and research without the looming pressure of entrance exams.

However, the system clearly requires improvement. I bet enhancing the mechanism design for the enrollment system in Phase 3 could mitigate many of the current issues. The summer camp phase could remain as a valuable opportunity for mutual evaluation between students and universities. The key challenge lies in developing a centralized admission system that can coexist with decentralized decision-making processes. This balance between centralization and autonomy is a compelling question for future policy development.