A paper I read recently is somewhat interesting. The model is very inspiring for an OM project I’m working on recently, whereas its mathematical method and results are immensely useful to learn from for another problem that I’ve been working on for a while. Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, and Mingfei Zhao. 2022. ABSTRACT We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by Blackwell. Initially, the data buyer has only partial information about the payoff-relevant state of the world. A data seller offers additional information about the state of the world. The information is revealed through signaling schemes, also referred to as experiments. In the single-agent setting, any mechanism can be represented as a menu of experiments. A recent paper by Bergemann et al.[8] present a complete characterization of the revenue-optimal mechanism in a binary state and binary action environment. By contrast, no characterization is known for the case with more actions. In this paper, we consider more general environments and study arguably the simplest mechanism, which only sells the fully informative experiment. In the environment with binary state and m≥3 actions, we provide an $O(m)$-approximation to the optimal revenue by selling only the fully informative experiment and show that the approximation ratio is tight up to an absolute constant factor. An important corollary of our lower bound is that the size of the optimal menu must grow at least linearly in the number of available actions, so no universal upper bound exists for the size of the optimal menu in the general single-dimensional setting. We also provide a sufficient condition under which selling only the fully informative experiment achieves the optimal revenue. ...

Today’s blog draws inspiration from Michael D. Smith’s perspective on higher education, as discussed in a recent episode of the podcast People I (Mostly) Admire, titled “Higher Education Is Broken. Can It Be Fixed?” . Btw, the podcast itself is part of the Freakonomics network, the academically inclined perspective is particularly sweetspot for an econ student. This episode elucidates the systemic flaws plaguing the U.S. higher education system. One pov involves diving into the market power of colleges. ...

I’m reading some papers about mechanism design on pricing of information, following up on this data trading reading session Bergemann et al. (AER 2018): The Design and Price of Information. Bergemann et al. (EC 2022): Is Selling Completely Information (Approximately) Optimal? Bergemann et al. (EC 2015): Selling Cookies. Hopefully, I’ll finish them within this week. I have a strong feeling that they will be immensely interesting. Before our discussion, a short notice: a review of numerous news posts and literature in econ-CS reveals a significant discrepancy between academic research on data trading in algorithmic game theory (AGT) and Econ-CS communities, and the evolving realities of the actual data trading market. It’s possible that there exists another body of literature I’m yet to discover; however, the current economic literature, particularly on information design, lacks a clear outline of a real-world data trading market. Moreover, with the rise of generative AI, the valuation of data, such as labeled data coveted by tech giants for exclusivity, needs reevaluation to align with AI training standards. ...

I’ve been researching on data trading. China established several state-owned data exchange centers (e.g. Shanghai Data Exchange) and they are gradually building momentum recently because of the generative-AI booming bubble. But it’s not a new thing. An early article ‘Data is giving rise to a new economy’ sort of predicted the prosperous market seven years ago (The Economist, May 6th 2017). Data are to this century what oil was to the last one: a driver of growth and change. Flows of data have created new infrastructure, new businesses, new monopolies, new politics and—crucially—new economics. Digital information is unlike any previous resource; it is extracted, refined, valued, bought and sold in different ways. ...

costume, escapism and narrative depth - a ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ show to watch.

Sabrina Carpenter’s hit Nonsense is a great song, both artistically and commercially. The song gives a “I-DONT-GIVE-A-SHIT” (IDGAS) energy. The singer herself said in Genius VERIFIED interview “…we were hitting a lot of walls and we’re like, you know what, let’s just literally write nonsense, no joke. and that’s how the song happened.” “A lot of our justification for lyrics was well it’s nonsense. so it doesn’t have to make any sense at all and we just have fun.” ...

I’ve got two amazing topics to write about. One is Sabrina Carpenter’s single Nonsense, the other is the final season of The Marvelous Mrs Maisel. Cheers! Art for art’s sake. Stayed tuned before the holiday specials.

Who doesn’t love Messi? There is something mesmerising about his minimalism. He has stripped the game back to its essentials; his greatest gift has perhaps been his capacity to select the lowest-tariff option necessary in any given situation. There is an impish grace to everything he does on a pitch and yet his success is rooted in cold, unfussy calculation. But recently, something other than pure football is all over the news. When Inter Miami announced their tour to HK on Feb. 4th, 2024, almost right after Christiano Ronaldo visiting Shenzhen a week ago, the storm has raged Chinese football internet and triggered discussions and debates - the stans never really settled. ...

Following competition consequences I, part II about competition and repugnancy. A repugnant market refers to a market where certain goods or services are considered objectionable or morally unacceptable to buy and sell, despite there being potential buyers and sellers. Examples include markets for organs, surrogacy, and certain forms of labor. However, beyond moral objections, these markets raise additional concerns, as said in Al Roth’s Who Gets What and Why, it’s important to remember that: ...

two market fokelores that have fascinated me for a while.