When a Sonata simply goes by COMPOSER-NAME-Sonata it signals something: The Sonata in A major for Violin and Piano by César Franck [or commonly just referred to as the Frank Sonata] is one of his best-known compositions, and is considered one of the finest sonatas for violin and piano ever written. It is an amalgam of his rich native harmonic language with the Classical traditions he valued highly, held together in a cyclic framework. Wikipedia ...

In 1877, Tchaikovsky married Antonina Milyukova. Two months later, the marriage turned out to be a disaster. Tchaikovsky fled from Moskow to his best (pen-)friend-slash-patron Madame Meck’s villa at Brailov: In the end, Antonina refused to sue for divorce, though she did agree to leave Moscow. (The unconsummated, much-regretted marriage endured legally for the rest of Tchaikovsky’s life.) Nonetheless, the weeks alone at Brailov were a welcome respite, and the estate became the titular “dear place” of the Souvenir d’un lieu cher, a suite of three short pieces for violin and piano. (LA Phil about the piece Souvenir d’un lieu cher) ...

Bazzini was a great violin virtuoso Born in Brescia, Italy in 1818, Bazzini fell under the spell of the great Niccolò Paganini, whom he met as a teenager. The renowned virtuoso encouraged the young violinist to begin concertizing, and he soon became one of the most highly regarded instrumentalists of the day. Schumann and Mendelssohn were among his fans. Itzhak Perlman remarked that that the composer hadn’t written anything else because he’d used up all the notes in La ronde. It has all the hallmarks of a violin showpiece: false harmonics, ricochet bowings, double-stop tremolos, left hand pizzicato – and indeed it has remained a “go-to” when a performer wants to pull out all the stops for an encore. ...

Very insightful article: Classical composers ignore amateur music making at their peril Edward Caine https://substack.com/home/post/p-195502594 Here are some quotes that I find contain profound and sharp diagnose of the industry. If you find it interesting, make sure to check out the OG article (link above). All rights belong to Mr Caine. As students, musicians often view amateur performance with a certain haughty scepticism and give it a wide berth, feeling that if they end up involved in amateur performance they are somehow “sliding backwards” from a position of a professional career. ...

The University of Chicago’s billenial concerto competition winner showcase took place today: here’s a recording of the performance: In particular, Anthony Yoon performs Tchaikovsky’s Violin Concerto In D Major, Op. 35 mvt I with the Symphony Orchestra, where he is also one of the 2nd violins. Both the orchestra and Anthony did a great job, I can guarantee you that we’re together (most of the times)

Professor Auster came to Chicago to give a talk in our theory seminar. Turns out for Pandora’s box, if boxes’ prior are ambiguous and decision maker seeks to minimize maximum regret against a clairvoyant oracle (an oracle who knows all the real reward of the boxes), the decision maker would exihbit choice overload (theoretically). Some additional notes on how to think about it using Yao’s (or Neumann’s) minmax lemma: Setup A decision maker face $n$ boxes. Search cost $c_i$ for each boxes. Each box’s reward is binary $v_i \in \{0, \bar v\}$. ...

Mechanism design is a framework for studying the set of implementable outcomes when rational agents have private information. Revelation principle is one of its key lemmas. Here’s a principled way to understand it: Setup Agents: $i \in [n] = \{1, \dots, n\}$. Types: Each agent $i$ has private type $t_i \in T_i$. The joint type space is $T = \prod_{i=1}^n T_i$. Prior: The type distribution (common prior) is $q \in \Delta(T)$. Assume $q$ is fully supported on $T$, i.e., $q(t) > 0$ for all $t \in T$. Outcomes: $x \in X$. Preferences: Each agent $i$ has a VNM utility function contingent on the outcome and the types of all agents: $$u_i : X \times T \to \mathbb{R}.$$ General Mechanism Definition. A (general) mechanism is a pair $(S, g)$, where $S = S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n$, with $S_i$ the set of strategies (messages) available to agent $i$, and $g$ is a (possibly stochastic) outcome function: ...

The VAR Model We observe a vector time series $Z_1, Z_2, \ldots, Z_T \in \mathbb{R}^m$ following a VAR($\ell$): $$ Z_{t+1} = \tilde {\mathbb N} + D \begin{pmatrix} Z_t \\ Z_{t-1} \\ \vdots \\ Z_{t-\ell+1} \end{pmatrix} + F\,W_{t+1}, \qquad W_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I_k). \tag{1} $$Known: the signals $Z_1, \ldots, Z_T$. Unknown: the coefficient matrices $\tilde {\mathbb N}$, $D$, and the covariance $FF'$. Key idea. Treat $(\tilde {\mathbb N}, D)$ as hidden states that never change, so the problem becomes an Hidden Markdov Model (HMM) with trivial state dynamics $\beta_{t+1} = \beta_t$ and a linear observation equation. We then update beliefs about $\beta$ recursively as data arrives. ...

以史为鉴, 可以知兴替 Using history as a mirror, one can predict a dynasty’s future. Some operations research archeology: Kantorovich and Zalgaller (1951): the 0-th column generation algorithm Eduardo Uchoa, Ruslan Sadykov. Mathematical Programming, 2026. This article probes the origins of the Column Generation technique. It begins with Kantorovich’s classic 1939 work, correcting widespread misconceptions about his contributions to the Cutting Stock Problem. It then brings to light Kantorovich and Zalgaller’s lesser-known 1951 book, which is revealed to contain a complete Column Generation algorithm. The article also places these contributions in the context of the turbulent USSR’s political and ideological environment, essential for a deeper understanding of their significance. ...

Professor Shleifer come over to Booth to talk in our Monday macro/intermational economic workshop. He’s so popular that we have to move to the largest classroom and it is filled. The admin bought enough sandwich for everyone though The Psychology of Macroeconomic Expectations Bordalo, Gennaioli, Lopez de Silanes, Schroeder, Shleifer, van Rooij (2026) There’s a version online in Booth’s website: https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/project/chicago-booth/faculty-and-insights/research-workshops/shleifer.pdf Behavioral economics and general economic theory have left an open question in modeling: whether non-domain-specific (NDS) experiences — a health crisis, a divorce, financial hardship — could causally shift macro beliefs through a psychological, non-informational channel. This paper did the job: ...