LP Characterization of Cheap Talk vs. Bayesian Persuasion Game
Another convenient way to view, compare, and solve Cheap Talk vs. Bayesian Persuasion. Linear-Programming Formulation: Cheap Talk vs. Bayesian Persuasion Consider an information environment $\langle \Omega, A, M, \mu_0, u, v \rangle$ with state space $\Omega$, action space $A$, signal space $M$, prior $\mu_0$, receiver utility $u(\omega,a)$, and sender utility $v(\omega,a)$. (Let every set be finite). Consider direct mechanisms. In general, the sender’s strategy $\sigma:\Omega \to \Delta(A)$ maps each state to a distribution over recommended actions, and the receiver’s strategy $\rho:A \to \Delta(A)$ specifies how she responds to each recommendation....